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Abstract
A proof is concurrent zero-knowledge if it remains zero-knowledge when many copies of the
proof are run in an asynchronous environment, such as the Internet. It is known that zero-
knowledge is not necessarily preserved in such an environment [24, 29, 4]. Designing concurrent
zero-knowledge proofs is a fundamental issue in the study of zero-knowledge since known zero-
knowledge protocols cannot be run in a realistic modern computing environment. In this paper
we present a concurrent zero-knowledge proof systems for all languages in NP. Currently, the
proof system we present is the only known proof system that retains the zero-knowledge property
when copies of the proof are allowed to run in an asynchronous environment. Our proof system
has O˜(log2 k) rounds (for a security parameter k), which is almost optimal, as it is shown in [4]
that black-box concurrent zero-knowledge requires Ω˜(log k) rounds.
Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser andMicali introduced the notion of resettable zero-knowledge,
and modified an earlier version of our proof system to obtain the first resettable zero-knowledge
proof system. This protocol requires kθ(1) rounds. We note that their technique also applies
to our current proof system, yielding a resettable zero-knowledge proof for NP with O˜(log2 k)
rounds.
1 Introduction
Zero-knowledge proof systems, introduced by Goldwasser Micali and Rackoff [21], are efficient
interactive proofs that yield no knowledge but the validity of the proven assertion. These proofs
have proven important tools for a variety of cryptographic applications. However, the original
definition of zero-knowledge considers security only in a restricted scenario in which the prover
and the verifier execute one instance of the proof disconnected from the rest of the computing
environment.
In recent years, several papers have studied the affect of a modern computing environment on the
security of zero-knowledge. In particular, many computers today are connected through networks
in which connections are maintained in parallel asynchronous sessions. It would be common to find
several connections (such as FTP, Telnet, An internet browser, etc.) running together on a single
workstation. Can zero-knowledge protocols be trusted in such an environment?
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1.1 Previous work
Composing zero-knowledge proofs in asynchronous environment was first mentioned by Feige [11],
and first explored in a rigorous setting by Dwork, Naor, and Sahai [9]. Dwork, Naor and Sahai
denoted zero-knowledge protocols that are robust to asynchronous composition concurrent zero-
knowledge protocols. They observed that several known zero-knowledge proofs, with a straight-
forward adaptation of their original simulation to the asynchronous environment, may cause the
simulator to work exponential time. Thus, it seems that the zero-knowledge property does not
necessarily carry over to the asynchronous setting.
Kilian, Petrank, and Rackoff [24] gave the first lower bound for concurrent zero-knowledge,
showing that any language that has a 4-rounds concurrent (black-box) zero-knowledge interactive
proof or argument is in BPP. Thus, a large class of known zero-knowledge interactive proofs and
arguments for non-trivial languages do not remain zero-knowledge in an asynchronous environment.
Rosen [29] has improved this lower bound from from 4 rounds to 7, and Canetti, Kilian, Petrank
and Rosen have recently improved the lower bound substantially showing that concurrent black-box
zero-knowledge proof systems for non-trivial languages require Ω˜(log k) rounds. A natural question
is whether there exists a fully asynchronous (concurrent) zero-knowledge proof for NP.
1.2 This work
In this paper, we exhibit the first (and currently the only known) concurrent (black-box) zero-
knowledge interactive proof for any language in NP. Our proof system has ω(log2 k) rounds, where
k is the security parameter. Namely, the running time of all efficient parties is bounded by a
polynomial in k, and so is the number of copies of the proof that may be run concurrently. Saying
that the number of rounds is ω(log2 k) rounds we mean that the number of rounds may be set to
h(k) · (log2 k), for any function h : N → N that cannot be bounded by any constant.
The concurrent zero-knowledge interactive proof for NP that we present relies on the exis-
tence of secure bit commitment schemes with statistical binding and bit commitment schemes with
statistical secrecy (see Section 2.2 below). Using [25] the first can be efficiently based on any
pseudo-random generator (and thus on any one-way function), and using [1, 26, 7], the latter can
be efficiently based on the existence of collision-intractable hash functions. Our proof system may
be run by an efficient prover that is given the witness for the (NP) assertion in the input.
Finally, the proof system we present is a family of proofs systems. It is parameterized by the
number of rounds. The proof as presented may be used with any number of rounds (above some
required constant). The analysis we provide shows that it is concurrent zero-knowledge when the
number of rounds is set to ω(log2 k). By the lower bound, we know that if we set the number of
rounds too low, then the proof system does not remain concurrent zero-knowledge. Possibly, the
same proof system remains zero-knowledge even if the number of rounds is set to O(log n), but we
do not know how to show it. This is an interesting open question.
1.2.1 Resettable zero-knowledge
Finally, we note that the techniques in [3] apply to our new protocol. Thus, our concurrent zero-
knowledge interactive proof can be modified to be made resettable zero-knowledge. Resettable zero-
knowledge proofs were presented by Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali [3]. Such proofs are
zero-knowledge proofs that on top of being concurrent, maintain zero-knowledge properties when
the verifier is allowed to run the prover repeatedly on a fixed (yet, randomly chosen) random tape.
The practical motivation behind such robustness is a use of zero-knowledge in smartcards, where
the prover (the card) can be reset by the verifier to run repeatedly without access to additional
random coin tosses. It is assumed that the actual random tape of the card is hidden from the
verifier, and it is shown in [3] how this hidden randomness can be used to allow such robustness of
a zero-knowledge proof.
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Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali modified an earlier version of our proof system
to obtain the first resettable zero-knowledge proof system. This protocol requires kθ(1) rounds.
We note that their technique also applies to our current proof system, yielding a resettable zero-
knowledge proof for NP with O˜(log2 k) rounds. Previously, there was no sub-polynomial resettable
zero-knowledge proof in a general asynchronous environment. We remark that as with concurrent
zero-knowledge, if one makes set-up assumptions, then one may get more efficient proofs. For
example, in the public key model there exist more efficient resettable zero-knowledge proofs, see [3].
The definition of resettable zero-knowledge and related issues appear in Section 8.1 below. For
a more detailed discussion, motivation, and definitions the reader is referred to [3].
1.3 In light of the lower bound
Several works have overcome the difficulty of the asynchronous setting by using some compromises.
For example, compromising the strength of zero-knowledge security, introducing witness indistin-
guishability [14], or putting limits on the asynchronisity of the system (a.k.a timing assumptions)
[9, 10, 5], or by making some set-up assumptions on the environment (such as a public key infras-
tructure) [6, 3].
1.4 Terminology
Some words on the terminology we are using. By zero-knowledge we mean computational zero-
knowledge, i.e., the distribution output by the simulation is polynomial-time indistinguishable
from the distribution of the views of the verifier in the original interaction. (See definitions in
Section 2.1 below.) Our proof is black-box zero-knowledge (see Section 2.4 below). The proof will
be perfectly sound, i.e., we will construct an interactive proof, yet it will be possible to run the
prover in polynomial time given a witness to the NP assertion that the prover is making.
1.5 Guide to the paper
In Section 2 we present some definitions and the tools we are using. In Section 3 we state our
results. In Section 4 we present the concurrent zero-knowledge interactive proof for NP. In Section
5 we provide a simulator for the interaction between the prover and any (adversarial) verifier. In
Section 6 we analyze the simulator with respect to a static schedule. Namely, the schedule may be
the worst possible, but it is not modified during the rewinds of the simulator. In Section 7 we show
that the simulator works as well also with respect to schedules that change dynamically during the
simulation. Thus, our proof system is concurrent zero-knowledge. Finally, in Section 8, we discuss
our protocol in the resettable zero-knowledge model.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we go over the definitions and the tools we are using. We postpone the definitions
and discussion of resettable zero-knowledge to Section 8.
2.1 Zero-knowledge proofs
Let us recall the concept of interactive proofs, as presented by [21]. For formal definitions and
motivating discussions the reader is referred to [21].
Definition 2.1 A protocol between a (computationally unbounded) prover P and a (probabilistic
polynomial-time) verifier V constitutes an interactive proof for a language L if there exists a negligible
fraction ε such that
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• Completeness: If x ∈ L then
Pr [(P, V )(x) accepts ] ≥ 1− ε(|x|)
• Soundness: If x 6∈ L then for any prover P ∗
Pr [(P ∗, V )(x) accepts ] ≤ ε(|x|)
Brassard, Chaum, and Cre´peau [1] suggested a modification of interactive proofs called arguments
in which the prover is also polynomial time bounded. Thus, the soundness property is modified to
be guaranteed only for probabilistic polynomial time provers P ∗.
Let (P, V )(x) denote the random variable that represents V ’s view of the interaction with P on
common input x. The view contains the verifier’s random tape as well as the sequence of messages
exchanged between the parties.
We briefly recall the definition of black-box zero-knowledge [21, 27, 17, 20]. The reader is
referred to [20] for more details and motivation.
Definition 2.2 A protocol (P, V ) is computational zero-knowledge (resp., statistical zero-knowledge)
over a language L, if there exists an oracle probabilistic polynomial time machine S (simulator) such
that for any polynomial time verifier V ∗ and for every x ∈ L, the distribution of the random variable
SV
∗
(x) is polynomially indistinguishable from the distribution of the random variable (P, V ∗)(x)
(resp., the statistical difference between M(x) and (P, V )(x) is a negligible function in |x|).
In this paper, we concentrate on computational zero-knowledge. In the sequel we will say zero-
knowledge meaning computational zero-knowledge.
2.2 Bit commitments
We include a short and informal presentation of commitment schemes. For more details and
motivation, see [15]. A commitment scheme involves two parties: The sender and the receiver.
These two parties are involved in a protocol which contains two phases. In the first phase the
sender commits to a bit, and in the second phase it reveals it. A useful intuition to keep in mind is
the “envelope implementation” of bit commitment. In this implementation, the sender writes a bit
on a piece of paper, puts it in an envelope and gives the envelope to the receiver. In a second (later)
phase, the reveal phase, the receiver opens the envelope to discover the bit that was committed on.
In the actual digital protocol, we cannot use envelopes, but the goal of the cryptographic machinery
used, is to simulate this process.
More formally, a commitment scheme consists of two phases. First comes the commit phase
and then we have the reveal phase. We make two security requirements which (loosely speaking)
are:
Secrecy: At the end of the commit phase, the receiver has no knowledge about the value committed
upon.
Binding property: It is infeasible for the sender to pass the commit phase successfully and still
have two different values which it may reveal successfully in the reveal phase.
Various implementations of commitment schemes are known, each has its advantages in terms of
security (i.e., binding for the receiver and secrecy for the receiver), the assumed power of the two
parties etc.
Two-round commitment schemes with perfect secrecy can be constructed from any collection
of claw-free permutations; see [15]. It is shown in [1] how to commit to bits with statistical
security, based on the intractability of certain number-theoretic problems. D˚amgard, Pedersen
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and Pfitzmann [7] give a protocol for efficiently committing to and revealing strings of bits with
statistical security, relying only on the existence of collision-intractable hash functions. This scheme
is quite practical and we adopt it for the verifiers in our protocol. For the prover, we use a
commitment scheme whose binding is information theoretic and security is computational. Such
schemes can be constructed from any one-way function, see [25]. For simplicity, we simply speak
of committing to and revealing bits when referring to the protocols of [7] for the verifier and [25]
for the prover.
The schemes we use have the property that the receiver chooses some random string in the
beginning which is later used for the commitments. It is a property of these schemes that with high
probability the random choice is “good” in the sense that a polynomial number of commitments
can be done with the same random choice without compromising the security of the commitment
scheme. This will be used for the resettable interactive proof in Section 8. For all protocols, we
need to say that the properties of the commitment schemes hold in the concurrent setting.
Claim 2.3 (Robustness of bit commitment schemes to a concurrent setting):
1. The binding property of any bit commitment scheme holds in the concurrent setting.
2. If the committer commits only on strings chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}k, then the
secrecy property of the commitment scheme holds also in the concurrent setting.
Proof: By definition, the binding property must be robust to asynchronous composition. Oth-
erwise, the committer may play a mental game in which his real stand-alone commitment is part
of an asynchronous game which he simulates, and then defeat the binding property in the normal
stand-alone world.
As for the secrecy, a similar argument may be more complicated, since the receiver cannot
simulate the behavior of the committer. Specifically, the committer has some information that
the receiver does not have: the value of the committed string, which may be used in the other
commitments. However, in our case, the committer commits only on uniformly chosen random
strings. Thus, if the committer follows the protocol, then the receiver is able to simulate the rest
of the environment and the above argument holds for secrecy as well. ✷
In the protocol we present the committers always commit on uniformly chosen random strings in
{0, 1}k . Thus, the commitment scheme is secure in the concurrent setting.
2.3 Witness Indistinguishability
Witness indistinguishable proofs were presented in [14]. The motivation was to provide a crypto-
graphic mechanism whose notion of security is similar though weaker than zero-knowledge, it is
meaningful and useful for cryptographic protocols, and the security is preserved in an asynchronous
composition. A witness indistinguishable proof is a proof for a language in NP such that the prover
is using some witness to convince the verifier that the input is in the language, yet, the view of
the verifier in case the prover uses witness w1 or witness w2 is polynomial time indistinguishable.
Thus, the verifier gets no knowledge on which witness was used in the proof. The formal definition
follows. For further discussion and motivation the reader is referred to [14].
We say that a relation R is polynomial time if there exists a machine that given (x,w) works
in polynomial time in |x| and determines whether (x, y) ∈ R. For any NP language there exists a
polynomial time relation RL such that L can be described as L = {x : ∃y, RL(x, y)}.
Definition 2.4 A proof system (P, V ) is witness indistinguishable over a polynomial time relation
R is for any V ′, any large enough x, any w1, w2 such that (x,w1) ∈ R and (x,w2) ∈ R, and
for any auxiliary input y for V ′, the view of V ′ in the interaction with P (x,w1) is polynomially
indistinguishable from the view of V ′ in the interaction with P (x,w2).
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It is shown in [14] that witness indistinguishability is preserved with asynchronous composition
of proofs. More precisely, if a proof is auxiliary-input witness indistinguishable and if the prover
can run in polynomial time given the witness, then asynchronous (concurrent) composition of such
proofs remains auxiliary-input witness indistinguishable (with efficient provers). See [14, 11] for
more details. Note that any (auxiliary-input) zero-knowledge proof (even one that is not concurrent)
is also (auxiliary-input) witness indistinguishable. In our proof system, we employ a constant round
(auxiliary-input) zero-knowledge proof for the languages in NP in which the prover has an efficient
procedure when given a witness to the NP-assertion such as in [16]. It follows that this proof is
also (auxiliary-input) witness indistinguishable. Furthermore, since such witness indistinguishable
proofs are also concurrent witness indistinguishable proof, we get that the sub-proof we employ is
concurrent witness indistinguishable.
2.4 Blackbox simulation
The initial definition of zero-knowledge [20] requires that for any probabilistic polynomial time
verifier Vˆ , a simulator S
Vˆ
exists that simulates Vˆ ’s view. Oren [27] proposes a seemingly stronger,
“better behaved” notion of zero-knowledge, known as black-box zero-knowledge. The basic idea
behind black box zero-knowledge is that instead of having a new simulator S
Vˆ
for each possible
verifier, we have a single probabilistic polynomial time simulator S that interacts with each possible
Vˆ . Furthermore, S is not allowed to examine the internals of Vˆ , but must simply look at Vˆ ’s
input/output behavior. That is, it can have conversations with Vˆ and use these conversations to
generate a simulation of Vˆ ’s view that is computationally indistinguishable from Vˆ ’s view of its
interaction with P .
At first glance, the limitations on S may seem to force S to be as powerful as a prover. However,
S has important advantages over a prover P , allowing it to perform simulations in probabilistic
polynomial time. First, it may set Vˆ ’s coin tosses as it wishes, and even run Vˆ on different sets
of coin tosses. More importantly, S may conceptually “back up” Vˆ to an earlier point in the
conversation, and then send different messages. This ability derives from S’s control of Vˆ ’s coin
tosses; since Vˆ otherwise operates deterministically, S can rerun it from the beginning, exploring
different directions of the conversation by trying various messages.
Indeed, all known proofs of zero-knowledge construct black-box simulations. There is no way
known to make use of a verifier’s internal state, nor to customize simulators based on the description
of Vˆ other than by using it as a black box.1 Thus, given the current state of the art, an impossibility
result for black-box zero-knowledge seems to preclude a positive result for the older definitions of
zero-knowledge.
2.5 Concurrent zero-knowledge
Informally, we consider a proof system that has many copies running. Each of them consists of
a prover and a verifier. We require that the provers do not cooperate. This can be also thought
of as one prover with many sessions, but the behavior of the prover in any of the proof does not
depend only on the current proof and not on the other copies of the proof. (This complicates the
construction of the proof system, since there is no central control that checks whether the verifiers
are trying to cheat, or that tries to coordinate the timing of various copies of the proof.) On the
other hand, we allow the verifiers to coordinate their strategies and information. Following [9],
we consider a setting in which a polynomial time adversary controls many verifiers simultaneously.
The adversary A takes as input a partial conversation transcript of a prover interacting with several
verifiers concurrently, where the transcript includes the local times on the prover’s clock when each
message was sent or received by the prover. The output of A will be a tuples of the form (V, α, t),
1As one slight exception, [22] proves security against space-bounded verifiers by considering the internal state of
the verifiers. However, these techniques do not seem applicable to more standard classes of verifiers.
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indicating that P receives message α from a verifier V at time t on P ′s local clock. The adversary
may either output a new tuple as above, or wait for P to output its next message to one of the
verifiers. The time that is written by the adversary in the tuple, must be greater than all times
previously used in the system (by messages sent to P or by P ). The view of the adversary on
input x in such an interaction (including all messages and times, and the verifiers random tapes) is
denoted (P,A)(x). The following definition formalizes the above using the black-box formulation.
We denote by (P,A)(x) the distribution on the view of A in its interaction with P .
Definition 2.5 We say that an interactive proof (or argument) system (P, V ) for a language L
is (computational) concurrent zero-knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time oracle
machine S (the simulator) such that for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary A, the distri-
butions (P,A)(x) and SA(x) are computational indistinguishable over the strings that belong to the
language L.
In what follows, we will usually refer to the adversary A as the adversarial verifier V ∗ or just the
verifier V ∗.
Simplifications:
To simplify the analysis, we will only care about the order of the messages sent in the interaction
and not about the delays between messages. To make the output of the simulator contain the
delays dictated by the verifier, our simulator may write the output with the required delays on a
working tape (instead of actually writing to the output tape) and after the order of messages and
their delays has been determined and written (by the simulator we describe in this paper), the
simulator may run a final stage in which it outputs the messages written on the working tape, in
the same order and while inserting the appropriate delays between the messages.
We further simplify the analysis by assuming that the prover responds immediately and with
no delay to the verifier’s messages. Of course, in real life, the adversarial verifier may insert a few
quick messages before the prover outputs his message. However, this has no effect on our proof.
The rewinding strategy should be modified to consider only verifier messages. Two points should
be noted: the simulator may be easily adapted to output the prover’s message at times dictated by
the verifier rather than immediately. The running time remains polynomial. The probability that
the simulator is able to finish the simulation process after “solving” all protocols (see Section 5
below) does not change. Note that within one protocol this changes nothing. The order of messages
remain the same and cannot be changed within one protocol.
2.6 The complexity parameters
In this paper, we simplify the discussion by using a single security parameter k. Our proof has
ω(log2 k) rounds and the security is preserved with a polynomial (in k) number of concurrent proofs.
It is possible to separate the number k of allowed concurrent proofs from the security parameter. If
we know that the number of proofs to be run concurrently is substantially smaller than the security
parameter, then the number of rounds relates (poly-logarithmically) to the number of possible
proofs (and not length of the input or the security parameter).
3 Main result
Our main result is the existence of poly-logarithmic round concurrent (and black box) zero-
knowledge interactive proof for NP. This result builds on the following assumptions.
Cryptographic Assumptions: We assume the existence of two rounds commitment schemes with
statistical security and the existence of two rounds commitment schemes with statistical binding.
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Both assumptions are implied by the existence of a family of claw-free permutation pairs (see
Section 2.2)
Let us state our main theorem given the above assumption.
Theorem 3.1 Assume the above cryptographic assumptions. Let k be a complexity parameter
bounding the size of the input. The verifier is polynomial time in k, and the concurrent proof may
contain a polynomial (in k) number of proofs concurrently. Then for any function t(·) asymptotically
greater than log2 k, i.e., t(k) = ω(log2 k), there exists a t(k)-round zero-knowledge interactive proof
for all languages in NP which is: computational, black-box, and concurrent.
This theorem is proven in Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7. First we present the protocol, next we present the
simulator, and last, we analyze the simulator. Note that the proof transforms any round efficient
zero-knowledge interactive proof in which the prover can be implemented in polynomial time when
given access to a witness to the NP theorem proven, into a concurrent zero-knowledge interactive
proof.
For resettable zero-knowledge, the construction takes as a starting point the round-efficient
proof of Goldreich and Kahan [16] and uses its specific structure. The theorem about round-
efficient resettable zero-knowledge is proven in Section 8:
Theorem 3.2 Assume the above cryptographic assumptions. Let k be a complexity parameter
bounding the size of the input. The verifier is polynomial time in k, and thus, may initiate at most
a polynomial number (in k) of incarnations of the prover. Then for any function t(·) asymptotically
greater than log2 k, i.e., t(k) = ω(log2 k), there exists a zero-knowledge argument for all languages
in NP which is: computational, black-box, and resettable.
4 The zero-knowledge proof system
Our concurrent zero-knowledge interactive proof system follows the ideas presented by Feige,
Lapidot and Shamir [12]. On an input theorem T , the proof consists of a proof-preamble of
2m = ω(log2 k) rounds and a proof body being a “standard” constant round auxiliary-input zero-
knowledge proof for a modified NP theorem T ′. The parameter m determines the round complexity
of the proof system. Our analysis shows that the proof system is concurrent zero-knowledge when
m is set to any function m = ω(log2 k), where k is the security parameter. In the proof-body one
may use any round-efficient auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proof for NP. The proof system has to
be of negligible error, of round complexity smaller than m, and in which the prover can run in
polynomial time given a witness to the NP theorem T ′ that it must prove. All known constant
round protocol such as [13, 2, 16] will do. All these (auxiliary-input) zero-knowledge proofs are also
(auxiliary-input) witness indistinguishable, which is enough for us. Feige and Shamir showed that
witness indistinguishability is preserved in this case also in the asynchronous setting [14]. Note
that the round complexity of the resulting proof system is O(m), and our proof holds when m is
set to any function satisfying m = ω(log2 k).
Let us concentrate now on the preamble, which is the main tool in transforming a regular zero-
knowledge proof into a concurrent one. Let T be the NP statement that the original prover would
like to prove. We use a preamble with 2m rounds to start the proof. In this preamble, P and V
each picks m strings in {0, 1}k denoted p1, p2, . . . , pm and v1, v2, . . . , vm respectively. The prover
P then proves that either T is true or for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, vi = pi. We denote this modified
theorem T ′. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, P will have to determine pi before vi is revealed. Thus, this
preamble will not give P a meaningful advantage in proving the theorem. However, the simulator
will be able to learn vi, and then rewind the proof and set pi = vi. Thus, the simulator will have a
witness to the modified theorem T ′, and it may act as a real prover in the body of the proof. The
full algorithm of the simulator is specified in Section 6 below.
The concurrent zero-knowledge argument for an input theorem T goes as follows:
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V → P : Commit to v1, v2, . . . , vm
P → V : Commit to p1
V → P : Reveal v1
P → V : Commit to p2
· · ·
V → P : Reveal vi
P → V : Commit to pi+1
· · ·
V → P : Reveal vm
P ↔ V : A zero-knowledge proof that T is true or ∃i s.t. vi = pi.
In words: The verifier begins by committing to all its strings v1, . . . , vn. After that, the prover
commits to pi and then the verifier reveals vi for each i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Finally, the prover gives a
zero-knowledge proof that T is true or there exists an i s.t. vi = pi.
If the verifier fails to open one of its commitments properly, then the prover immediately aborts
the proof. Ignoring the negligible chance that the commitments of the verifier turn out to fail the
binding property, the strings v1, . . . , vm are fixed after the first round for the rest of the proof. Note
that vi is revealed only after the prover P commits on the value of pi. Thus, if the security of the
bit commitment holds, then P can fix pi = vi with a negligible probability. Furthermore, ignoring
the negligible chance that the commitment of the prover is not secure, the verifier does not learn
the value of any of the pi’s so he can never tell whether it holds that pi = vi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Denote the probability that the prover fails to prove a true statement by the completeness
error and the probability that the verifier accepts a false statement (when the prover uses an
arbitrary strategy within its computational limits) the soundness error. We claim that these error
probabilities are only slightly changed by the modification made to the proof.
Claim 4.1 If the original proof has soundness error εs and completeness error εc then the modified
proof has completeness error at most εc, and soundness error at most εs+ ε for some negligible (in
the security parameter k) ε.
Proof: It is easy to see that the completeness property is not harmed by the modification. Re-
garding soundness, the additional advantage a prover P ∗ may get over the original proof is the
possibility to set pi = vi for one of the rounds. We need to show that that cannot happen too often.
Here, the security of the verifier’s bit commitment is not enough. In order to make sure that the
prover cannot cheat, we must require that the verifier’s commitment is non-malleable [8]. In order
to cheat, the prover does not need to know committed bit. It just needs to produce a commit-
ment such that after the verifier opens its commitment to a certain string, the prover may open its
commitment to the same string. Preventing this is exactly the issue in the non-malleability study,
and one may use non-malleable commitment schemes as in [8] to make sure that the soundness
property is preserved. However, it is not known how to achieve non-malleability in a constant round
commitment schemes. Instead, we use the following trick to obtain non-malleability and keep the
scheme efficient. The verifier commits using statistical secrecy. Thus, the committed value of the
prover do not depend on the committed value (but with negligible probability). Next, the prover
commits with an unconditionally binding scheme. Thus, the committed value binds the prover
before it gets to see the verifier opening its commitment. Using these two schemes, the soundness
holds. ✷
We remark that the problem is not symmetric: we do not need non-malleable commitment
schemes for the prover. The reason for this asymmetry is that the prover never opens its com-
mitments, so the verifier can only act upon the knowledge it gets from the commit stage. This
information gives the verifier no advantage by the security property of the commitment scheme.
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5 The simulator
We provide a black-box simulator to the above proof system (black-box simulation is discussed in
Section 2.4). The adversarial verifier V ∗ is given as a black box and the simulator interacts with it.
This interaction will be used by the simulator to obtain a witness to the modified theorem T ′. We
assume that by the time the simulator gets to the body of the proof, it has such a witness. Thus,
when simulating the main body, the simulator acts as the prover (which is an efficient algorithm
given a witness to the NP theorem that has to be proven).
The simulator will succeed in ”guessing” one of the vi’s by rewinding steps in the preamble.
(Recall that the real prover cannot rewind the verifier, and cannot get this advantage.) In particular,
the simulator will rewind the verifier at several points during their interaction. If the verifier reveals
vi before a rewind, and the simulator rewinds the verifier back far enough, it may change the value
of pi and commit on pi = vi. Since the verifier is committed to the value vi (as of the first round
of the interaction), then unless the rewind goes beyond the first round of the particular proof,
the simulator need not worry that vi may change after it sets the commitment on pi. Once the
simulator has ensured that for some round i pi = vi in the preamble of a proof Π, we say that it has
solved the proof Π. It can complete the rest of the simulation of Π without further rewinding, by
choosing pj arbitrarily for any j 6= i and by playing the real prover in the main body of the proof
Π (recall that after solving a proof, it has a witness to the theorem T ′ that has to be proven). We
stress that the rest of the simulation requires no further rewinding. A key feature of this protocol
is that any rewind in any of the m rounds of the preamble suffices to solve the proof. Of course, if
during a rewind the simulator is able to solve more than one proof by setting pj’s of other proofs
to values of vj’s that were discovered during the first run of rewound interval, then the simulator
does that. It always solves the maximum number of proofs it can in a rewind.
Note that rewinding one step in one proof may render irrelevant the simulation of steps in other
proofs that took place in between those steps. Thus, choosing a step to rewind according to the
need to solve a proof Π is dangerous. It may lead the simulation to run an exponentially many
steps as noted in [9] and proved for a set of protocols in [24]. We employ a different strategy of
rewinding. We specify a fixed rewinding schedule regardless of the history of the interaction and
the scheduling of the proofs so far. Running this rewinding schedule will guarantee a polynomial
amount of work, so that the simulation is polynomial time. Nevertheless, whatever schedule of
proofs the adversarial verifier-scheduler may use, the simulation is guaranteed to solve all proofs
during their preamble with high probability.
Whenever the simulator rewinds the verifier, the second run of the rewind is the one that the
simulator uses to continue the interaction. The first run is only used to get information and is
then abandoned. The output is composed of the last full run, which is composed of second runs of
relevant rewinds.
One of the most problematic issues in the design of the simulator is the following. During the
run of the simulator, the adversarial verifier V ∗ may choose to send inappropriate messages. For
example, it may choose not to reveal a value vi that it has committed on in the first round. The
run of the simulator is composed of rewinds: it executes an interaction with the verifier V ∗, then it
rewinds V ∗ and makes a second run, in which it may set the pi’s according to information on vi’s
obtained in the first run. When the adversarial verifier V ∗ sends an inappropriate message for a
proof Π the simulator aborts sending messages to V ∗ for this proof Π (as the normal prover would
have done). If that happens in the first run of a rewind it bears a bad affect: the simulator cannot
solve the proof Π after rewinding since it did not get to see the string vi. However, if the verifier V
∗
sends a bad message in the second run of a rewound interval, then the proof Π is considered solved:
the real prover aborts the interaction with the verifier in Π, and so does the simulator. This proof
does not require solving since the body of the proof is not executed.
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5.1 The adversarial scheduler uses round slots
We begin by simplifying our view of the adversarial schedule. Recall that we are running k pream-
bles, each with 2m rounds. Like discussed in Section 2.5, we assume, w.l.o.g., that the real prover
(and so also the simulator) always answers immediately. Also, we do not care about delays imposed
by the verifier. We only care about the order of the various rounds in the full interaction. Thus,
we get that the adversarial verifier V ∗ may schedule an overall number of k ·m pairs of rounds in
the preambles. When specifying the rewinding strategy, we are only interested in the schedule of
the preambles. We do not care how the bodies of the proofs are scheduled and whether they are
rewound. We will never need to rewind the bodies: the simulator will behave like the real prover
in the bodies, however, bodies may be rewound due to requirements on preambles of other proofs
that run concurrently.
Let us make a remark about the possibility that the adversarial verifier schedules messages in
parallel. In the sequel, we do not explicitly consider parallel pairs of rounds. If the adversary sends
more than one verifier’s message to the prover in parallel, then the prover answers all of them in
parallel. Thus, we get less then k ·m pairs of actual rounds run. In the analysis we will analyze the
probability that “something bad” happens within a specific proof, ignoring the rest of the proofs
that run with it. Thus, it will not matter if this proof is run in parallel to other proofs. Note
that rounds of the same proof cannot run in parallel, since the order within a proof is guaranteed
to be preserved in the concurrent setting. Parallel repetitions will reduce the number of pairs of
rounds and that may only make the simulation more efficient. We will not explicitly discuss parallel
repetitions in the sequel.
For simplicity, from now on we will abuse the term round to denote a pair of rounds. Namely,
in what follows, a round consists of a message of the verifier followed by an immediate response by
the prover.
To summarize, we have reduced our view of the scheduled proofs to the adversarial verifier V ∗
scheduling km preamble rounds, with the only constraint that within a proof the order of rounds
is preserved. We think of this schedule as assigning rounds of the various (preambles of) proofs to
km “slots” of rounds. We consider the km slots by their order in time, and specify the rewinding
strategy with respect to these slots, regardless of how the adversary assigns actual proof rounds to
these slots. For example, we may let the simulator rewind the verifier to the first slot after running
the second slot. More generally, After reading the verifier’s message in any of the round-slots, the
simulator may rewind the simulation (and the verifier) to any previous round-slot of the simulation.
We will specify rewinding in the following manner. A rewind (i← j), for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ km, means
that after reading the verifier’s message of round slot j, the simulator rewinds the verifier back
to just before the prover message in round slot i. When running the rewound interval the second
time, the simulator may change its message in round slot i as well as any other message it made in
the round slots between i and j − 1.
5.2 Specification of the rewind timing
We use recursion to specify the rewinding timing. At the top level of the recursion, the simulator
is running all the round slots 1..mk. The simulator rewinds the first half of the round slots and
then the second half of these round slots (regardless of which rounds of which proofs appear in
the round-slots). It then “feeds” each of these mk/2 round slots to the recursion. Namely, at the
second level of the recursion, each of the halves is split into halves and each quarter is rewound.
In case the number of round slots is odd, we let the first half contain ⌈mk/2⌉ round slots and the
second half contain ⌊mk/2⌋ round slots. Finally, at the bottom of the recursion there is an interval
containing one round slot. There is no need to rewind one round slot (yet an interval of two round
slots is rewound).
Let us explain this rewinding schedule with some examples. Suppose the number of round slots,
mk, is 4. Then the round slots are run by the simulator in the following order: 1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 3,
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4. Using the rewinding syntax with the above sequence, we may write: (1← 2), (3← 4). When
mk = 8, the round slots have the following order: 1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 3, 4, 1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 3, 4, 5, 6,
5, 6, 7, 8, 7, 8, 5, 6, 5, 6, 7, 8, 7, 8. Using the rewinding syntax with the above sequence, we may
write: (1← 2), (3← 4), (1← 4), (1← 2), (3← 4), (5← 6), (7← 8), (5← 8), (5← 6), (7← 8).
6 Analysis of the simulator with respect to a static schedule
To simplify the presentation of the analysis, we start in this section by showing that the simulator
works well for a static schedule. In a static schedule, the adversarial verifier V ∗ chooses the (worst
possible) schedule for the simulator, but this schedule is fixed and does not change during the
simulation. In Section 7 below, we extend the argument to the case that the schedule is dynamic
and may change as a function of the adversary’s random coins and the history of the simulation so
far.
We first note that the overall number of rounds run in the rewinding recursion, as specified, is
at most (mk)2 and thus, the simulator runs in polynomial time. Also, the simulator plays almost
exactly the role of the prover in the second run of all rewinds (which also include the output of
the simulation). There are two differences. One is that some of the committed values pi satisfy
pi = vi. However, if Vˆ ’s behavior is changed because of this fact in a way that is noticeable in
polynomial time, then the commitment scheme of the prover are not secure. The other change in
the protocol is that the simulator uses different witnesses than the prover normally uses in the body
of the protocol. But that difference is polynomially indistinguishable since the proof body is witness
indistinguishable (also in the concurrent setting). So Vˆ ’s behavior and view in the simulation is
polynomial time indistinguishable from its behavior and view when interacting with the real prover
(both with respect to the content of the messages and to their schedule). To summarize, the output
of the simulation is indistinguishable from the interactive proof assuming that the simulator solves
all copies of the proof.
Our goal is to show that with overwhelming probability the simulator will manage to obtain
a witness for T ′ during the simulation of the preamble. We start with some properties of the
rewinding schedule. We denote the intervals that are rewound rewind intervals. Because of the
(recursive) manner we defined the rewinding schedule, the rewind intervals are either disjoint or
contained within each other. So for any two rewind intervals (i← j) and (k ← ℓ) if i < ℓ ≤ j, then
it holds that k must be greater or equal to i. In the above case, in which the rewind interval (k ← ℓ)
is contained within the rewind interval (i← j) we will say that the rewind (i← j) dominates the
rewind (k ← ℓ).
Definition 6.1 We say that a rewind (k ← ℓ) dominates the rewind (i← j) if k ≤ i < j ≤ ℓ.
We call a run of the simulator against a (black-box) verifier V ∗ good if the simulator solves each
of the proofs during the preamble and before it gets to simulating the main body of the proof.
We would like to show that the above rewinding timing lets the simulator get “good” runs with
overwhelming probability, no matter what schedule is chosen for the messages in the proofs. During
the simulation, we do not need to rewind bodies of proofs, though, of course rewindings of a proof
body that happens while rewinding a preamble of another proof does not hurt the simulation.
A proof Π may be solved via a rewind (i← j) if there are at least two rounds of Π appearing
within the round slots i, i + 1, . . . , j , and the proof Π does not begin or end during the round
slots i + 1, i + 2, . . . , j. The reason for precluding the first round is that if we rewind past the
first round, the verifier may pick a new vector v1, . . . , vm and make the information obtained in the
first run of the rewind useless. The proof is actually solved in such a rewind if the verifier behaves
“well” (i.e., follows the protocol) in both runs of the rewind interval. In this case, we have two
consecutive rounds of the proof Π: rounds a and a + 1 (2 ≤ a ≤ m − 2) of Π within the rewind
interval. Thus, in the second run of these rounds, the simulator can set pa in the preamble to the
value va obtained in the first round and solve the proof. The reason we preclude the first round
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of the proof Π from the rewind interval is that if we rewind past the first round of the proof, then
V ∗ gets to run its first round again and it may choose new values for v1, . . . , vm. In particular, va
may change, and the simulator would not know the new value of va to set as pa. The reason that
we require that the preamble does not end before the rewind, i.e., that round m of the proof Π is
not within the rewind interval, is that a proof must be solved before the preamble ends. Else, the
main body may start, and the simulator will noticeably fail to simulate the proof body, possibly
causing the verifier to stop cooperating with the rest of the simulation.
We would like to point out that a rewind may solve the proof in any level of the recursion. If
there exists a rewind (i← j) that may solve the proof, and there exists a larger rewind (k ← ℓ)
that dominates it, then the fact that we rewind (k ← ℓ) does not “ruin” the solution of the proof
obtained in rewind (i← j). This is true since in both runs of the rounds ℓ, ℓ + 1 . . . , k in the
dominating rewind interval we rewind (i← j). So even if the rewind (i← j) happens again and
again because of dominating rewinds, in each of the runs it may solve the proof again.
In what follows, we will restrict our attention to the minimal rewinding intervals that may
solve a proof. If a proof may be solved by a rewind (k ← ℓ), then sometimes it may also be solved
by several rewinds that dominate (k ← ℓ) just because they dominate it. However, we will be
interested only in the smallest rewind interval that may solve a proof. Minimality is expressed in
Conditions (1) and (4) of the following definition. This minimality property will be used to get
independence between the relevant intervals.
Definition 6.2 We say that a rewind (k ← ℓ) may solve a proof Π if the following four conditions
hold:
1. Exactly two rounds of the preamble of Π take place during round slots k, k + 1, . . . , ℓ,
2. the first round of Π takes place at a round slot i < k,
3. the last round of Π takes place at a round slot j > ℓ, and
4. The first round of Π appears in the first half of the rewind interval (k ← ℓ) and the second
round of Π appears in the second half of the rewind interval (k ← ℓ).
Note that if Π has two rounds in the same half of the rewind interval (k ← ℓ), then there exists
a dominated interval that may solve Π. This the ratio behind Part (4) of the definition. We now
show that many rewinds may solve Π.
Lemma 6.3 For any schedule of k copies of the proof preambles (in the mk round slots), if a
preamble of a specific proof Π completes in round slot ℓ, then there are at least
⌈
m
log(mk)+1
⌉
− 2
rewind intervals that complete by round ℓ and that may solve Π.
Proof: We first show that there are at least
⌈
m
log(mk)+1
⌉
rewind intervals that satisfy Conditions (1)
and (4) in Definition 6.2 above. We then note that at most two of these intervals may foil Conditions
(2) or (3), thus the number of rewinds that may solve the proof Π is at least
⌈
m
log(mk)+1
⌉
− 2 as
required. Clearly, any relevant interval must end by round ℓ, since the preamble terminates at
round ℓ.
Fix a proof Π and any schedule of the rounds for all the proofs. We denote a rewind interval
good if it satisfies Conditions (1) and (4) in Definition 6.2 above (with respect to Π). Consider
the rewinds by the height of the recursion. At the top level, i.e., recursion height ⌈log(mk)⌉, we
have mk round slots. In these round slots we have m rounds of the proof Π. In each recursion
invocation, all round slots of the current level rewind interval are split into two almost2 equal parts
2If the number of round slots is odd, then the left interval has one more round slot than the right interval.
13
and participate in two rewind intervals of a lower recursive level. This splitting goes down the
recursion until we are left with one or two round slots at recursion level 1. If we consider the
rounds of the specific proof Π as scheduled in the round slots, then there are m rounds scattered
at the top level, which are split into two in each recursion invocation. The split of these rounds of
Π is not necessarily equal (or even close to equal), since there may be other rounds of other proofs
that appear in the (equal) split of the round slots.
In the following, we claim that if there are r rounds of Π in a rewind interval of level h, then
these rounds participate in at least
⌈
r
h+1
⌉
good rewind intervals with respect to Π. Assigning the
recursion level h ≤ log(mk) of the top level, and the number r = m of rounds in the preamble of
Π in the top level, we get the validity of the assertion in Lemma 6.3.
Claim 6.4 For any schedule of k copies of the proof (in mk round slots), and for any specific proof
Π. Let r be an integer, 2 ≤ r ≤ m, and let h be an integer such that r ≤ 2h. Suppose there are r
rounds of a proof Π in a rewind interval of recursion level h. Then these rounds participate in at
least
⌈
r
h+1
⌉
good rewind intervals with respect to the proof Π.
Proof: We prove the claim by an induction on r. Let r = 2. if the two rounds are split in the
current recursion invocation, then the current rewind interval is good. Otherwise, the two rounds
may stay together for several invocations of the recursion and then get split, thus, making a good
rewind interval at some lower level. Finally, they may stay together until the bottom level, which
makes the bottom level a good rewind interval with respect to the proof Π. Thus, these 2 rounds
participate in at least 1 good rewind interval, as required.
Now, suppose that the claim is correct for all 2 ≤ r′ < r and let us prove that it holds for r
rounds. Consider the partitioning of the r rounds of the current rewind interval into two rewind
intervals when invoking the next recursion. (Recall that each rewind interval is split into two rewind
intervals.) Denote by r1 the number of rounds that go into the first rewind interval, and by r2 the
number of rounds that are assigned into the second rewind interval. We know that r1+ r2 = r and
assume w.l.o.g. that r1 ≤ r2. We split the analysis into 3 possible cases.
Case 1: r1 ≥ 2. In this case, we may use the induction hypothesis. The recursion level of the
two rewind intervals that contain the r1 and r2 rounds is h − 1. By the induction hypothesis, the
number of good rewind intervals is at least:
⌈
r1
h
⌉
+
⌈
r2
h
⌉
≥
⌈
r1 + r2
h
⌉
≥
⌈
r
h+ 1
⌉
and we are done with Case 1.
Case 2: r1 = 1. In this case, we know that r2 = r − 1 ≥ 2 (since r ≥ 3), thus, we may use
the induction hypothesis for the second rewind interval. Nothing is guaranteed for the first rewind
interval to which only one round was assigned. By the induction hypothesis, we get that the number
of good rewind intervals is at least:
⌈
r2
h
⌉
=
⌈
r − 1
h
⌉
≥
⌈
r
h+ 1
⌉
and we are done with Case 2.
Case 3: r1 = 0. In this case, we cannot use the induction hypothesis, since r2 = r. Thus, we
check what may happen to these r rounds as we go down the recursion. These rounds may stay
together in a single rewind interval only at recursion levels greater than ⌈log(r)⌉, since there are at
most 2h
′
round slots at a rewind interval of recursion level h′. So there exists a level 2 < h′ < h at
which the rounds r are split into r1 ≥ 1 rounds and r2 ≥ 1 rounds for the rewind intervals of level
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h′ − 1. By the same argument as in Cases 1 and 2, we get that the number of good intervals that
these r rounds participate in is at least:
⌈
r
h′ + 1
⌉
≥
⌈
r
h+ 1
⌉
and we are done with Case 3 and with the proof of Claim 6.4. ✷
As mentioned above, this also concludes the proof of Lemma 6.3 since for any proof Π there
are m rounds at recursion level ⌈log(mk)⌉, and since only two of them may contain the first or last
round of the preamble. ✷
6.1 Why the rewinding works
We would like to claim now that the simulator is able to solve each proof during its preamble and
before it is required to simulate the main body of the proof with high probability. By Lemma
6.3, for each of the k proofs, there are at least
⌈
m
log(mk)
⌉
− 2 rewind intervals that may solve it.
Of course, it is enough that for each proof there is one rewind that actually solves it during the
preamble (rather than may solve it). If we have one such rewind for each proof, the simulator can
properly simulate each proof and all of them together no matter what the schedule is.
However, it is not always the case that a proof is solved in a rewind that may potentially solve
it. The reason is that the adversarial verifier V ∗ may sometimes not open the commitment of a
round of a proof Π. If the verifier V ∗ does not open the commitment, then the real prover aborts
the proof Π. In a rewind interval that may solve Π there are exactly two rounds of Π (which are
not the first or last round). Denote the number of these rounds in the proof Π by a and a+1. The
proof is solved in this rewind unless the following event happens:
1. the verifier does not reveal the committed value va in the first run, but
2. the verifier does reveal the committed value va in the second run.
All three other alternatives (i.e., the verifier reveals the committed values in both runs, or does
not reveal the committed value in both runs, or reveals the committed value only in the first run)
allow the simulator solve the proof Π in this rewind. If the verifier reveals the committed value in
the first run, then the proof is solved, since the simulator may set the value of its string pa to va
that it has learned. If the verifier does not reveal the committed value both in the first and second
run, then the proof Π is also solved, since the prover does not answer any of the following rounds
of the proof Π, and the simulator may easily “simulate” that.
We stress that the following naive solution would not work here: output an aborted proof if
either in the first or in the second run V ∗ does not reveal the committed value. This solution is not
good, since it increases the probability of aborting Π above the probability of aborting Π in the
real proof. Thus, the simulation may become polynomially distinguishable from the original proof.
Let us compute the probability that a rewind that may solve the protocol fails to solve it. When
we solve a proof, the second run is different from the first run. In particular, the value of some
pi equals the value of some vi and the verifier may note that an interval is run the second time
by noting that some other proof Π′ has been solved in this rewind interval. However, the prover
is using a commitment scheme to secretly commit on the strings pi’s in all the proofs. Using the
secrecy of the commitment scheme, the verifier cannot tell that it has been rewound, so it cannot
make an effort to abort the first run and behave well on the second run. Therefore, the probability
that the verifier aborts in the first run is similar to the probability that it aborts in the second
run of the rewind interval. These two probabilities are equal up to an (additive) negligible fraction
(representing the probability that the commitment scheme fails). Whatever the probability p that
V ∗ chooses not to reveal the committed value is, the probability that it does not reveal in the first
run of a rewind, yet it does reveal in the second run, is p(1 − p+ ε) ≤ 1/4 + ε for some negligible
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fraction ε. In the sequel, we assume that any rewind that may solve the proof indeed solves it with
probability at least 2/3.
We go on and compute the probability that the simulation succeeds, i.e., that each proof is
solved before its preamble terminates. Note that a preamble of a proof Π may terminate several
times, since Π may be completely (or partially) rewound several times and in particular, its last
round of the preamble may be run several times. At the worst case, the preamble of each of the k
proofs terminates a number of times that equals the overall number of times that a rewind interval
is executed. This number is at most 2⌈log(km)⌉ ≤ 2km, i.e., a polynomial in k. We will show that
the simulator fails to solve any particular proof with a negligible probability. Thus, it fails to solve
any of (the polynomial number of) the proofs with negligible probability as well.
For any proof Π, if the preamble of Π is completed, then the number of rounds that may solve
Π is at least a
def
=
⌈
m
log(mk)
⌉
− 2. Since we set m = ω(log2 k) and since a realistic value of m satisfies
m < k, then this number is
a ≥
ω(log2 k)
log(k) + log(m)
= ω(log k).
We note now that all rewind intervals that may solve the proofs are disjoint in time. This follows
since overlapping intervals must contain one another by the definition of the rewinding intervals.
On the other hand, by the minimality of the intervals (Requirements (1) and (4) of Definition 6.2)
a rewind that may solve the proof Π does not contain another rewind that may solve the proof
Π. Thus all these a rewind intervals are disjoint and the probability that the proof is actually
solved in any of them is independent and at least 1/3. So for any occurrence of a proof Π, the
probability that the simulator fails to solve it is at most (1/3)a, which is a negligible fraction (in
k). By the summation bound, the probability that the simulator fails in any of the (polynomially
many) occurrences of proofs is also negligible.
7 Extending the analysis for the dynamic schedule
We now move to the more difficult, yet realistic case, in which the verifier does not fix the schedule
of the messages in the mk round slots in advance, but may determine which message to schedule
in the next round slot depending on the history so far and its random coins. Looking back at
the analysis of the previous section, the problem now is that the rewind intervals in which a proof
may be solved constitute a random variable. Each time a new rewind interval is started, there is
a probability that the interval will include two rounds of the proof (which are not the first or last
round). This probability depends on the random tape of the adversarial verifier, the history so far,
and the behavior of the prover (or the simulator) during the rewind interval. It is possible that in
the first run of the rewind interval V ∗ will choose to include two rounds of the proof but in the
second round it will choose not to. The security of the prover’s bit commitment gives us, again, a
guarantee that the first run and the second run of the rewind have similar behavior.
As before, we ask ourselves what is the probability that a preamble of a proof Π ends without
the proof being solved by the simulator. At each point of the simulation one or more rewinds may
start. The simulator solves the proof Π during a rewind interval ρ if the first run of ρ includes
exactly two rounds of the proof Π that are not the first or the last rounds, and the verifier reveals
its committed value properly. Let us present the explicit definitions.
Definition 7.1 (Dynamic analogue of Definition 6.2:) we say that a run of a rewind ρ (either
first or second run) is interesting with respect to a proof Π if it includes exactly two rounds of the
preamble of Π that are neither the first nor the last round of the preamble, and each being in a
different half of the rewind interval.
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Definition 7.2 We say that a run of a rewind ρ (either first or second run) is good with respect
to a proof Π if it is interesting and the verifier properly reveals its commitments in the second of
these two rounds. If a run is not good with respect to Π, we call it bad with respect to Π.
If the first run is good with respect to a proof Π, then the proof Π is solved (no matter what the
second run is). For each run of a rewind ρ, depending on the history so far, there is a probability
pρ, determined by the adversarial verifier, that a run of this rewind is be good with respect to Π.
By the security of the prover’s commitment scheme, the probability that the first run is good is
equal up to an (additive) negligible fraction to the probability that the second run is good. Lemma
7.3 is similar to Lemma 6.3.
Lemma 7.3 In any schedule of k copies of the proof (in mk round slots), if a preamble of a specific
proof Π completes in round ℓ, then there are at least
⌈
m
log(mk)+1
⌉
−2 rewind intervals that completed
before round ℓ with a second good run with respect to Π.
Proof: In the same way as in the proof of Lemma 6.3 such number of intervals must exist in any
transcript that has a completed preamble in it. It remains to recall that the simulation always
continues with the second run of all previous rewinds. Thus, at any point in the simulation time,
all rewind intervals that have been finished have been fixed by the second run of the rewind. This
means that a transcript that has a completed preamble in it must contains at least
⌈
m
log(mk)+1
⌉
− 2
such rewind intervals and they all contain the second runs of all rewinds. ✷
By Lemma 7.3, before a preamble may complete, the history must contain at least a
def
=⌈
m
log(mk)+1
⌉
− 2 good second runs. However, for the proof to be completed unsolved, all the
first runs of all previously completed rewinds must be bad with respect to Π. We will show that
this happens with negligible probability.
Lemma 7.4 The probability that there exists a preamble of a proof Π that ends well during the
simulation but is not solved is negligible.
Proof: We show that for any specific copy Π of the proof whose preamble has completed, the
probability that the preamble ends well, yet Π remains unsolved is negligible. Since there is a
polynomial number of proofs and each of the preambles may end a polynomial number of times,
then we get that the probability that a preamble of any of the proofs remains unsolved when it
ends is negligible.
Consider the run of the simulator. At each point of the simulation, one or more rewind intervals
may start. At each of these points there is some probability p that the run of one of the rewinds
interval will be good with respect to Π. As discussed before, if the commitment scheme that the
prover uses is secure, then the probability that the first run is good is equal to the probability
that the second round is good up to an additive negligible fraction. We would like to compute the
probability that the preamble of the proof instance Π ends well without being solved. By Lemma
7.3, for any possible schedule of the proof instance Π, it must include at least a intervals that were
good in the second run with respect to Π. By our definition of a good interval, these intervals are
non-overlapping (Recall the minimality condition of Definition 7.1).
We may think of the adversarial verifier as running the following stochastic experiment, which
we denote the sequential experiment. It runs serially through tests (which are the rewinds). For
the ith test, based on the history so far and its random tape, the adversary chooses a probability
pi. (This is the probability that the first run of the interval ends well. The probability that the
second run ends well is at most pi + εi for some negligible fraction εi.) Then, with probability
(1 − pi)(pi + εi) the adversary wins the test, for some negligible fraction εi. (The first run is bad
and the second is good.) With probability pi it looses the whole experiment (the first run is good
and the simulator has solved the proof Π). In this case we say that the adversary dies. Finally, with
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probability (1−pi)(1−pi−εi) nothing happens, i.e., the adversary neither wins nor dies (both runs
are not interesting). The goal of the adversary is to win at least a tests in the experiment without
dying. The probability that the adversary succeeds in the sequential experiment is an upper bound
on the probability that the preamble of a proof Π ends without being solved. The reason is that
when a preamble completes without being solved, all first runs must be bad and at least a runs
must be good. The number of tests run during the sequential experiment is b. In our case b ≤ 2mk.
We now analyze the sequential experiment with parameters a and b.
Claim 7.5 Let b and a be two positive integers such that a < b and b is bounded by a polynomial
(in k). Then the probability that the adversary wins the sequential experiment with parameters a
and b is at most (2/3)a.
Proof: In the sequential experiment, the adversary chooses a probability pi in each round 1 ≤ i ≤ b.
In each of the tests, with probability pi the adversary fails the whole experiment. With probability
(1 − pi)(pi + εi) it wins the ith test, where εi is a negligible fraction (in k). With probability
(1− pi)(1− pi − εi) nothing happens and we move to the next test.
We will show that for any ℓ ≥ 0, the probability that the adversary goes from winning ℓ tests to
winning ℓ+1 tests without getting killed in between, is at most 2/3, regardless of the choice of the
probabilities pi’s. From that we get that the probability that the adversary wins a tests without
getting killed is at most (2/3)a.
Suppose the adversary has won ℓ tests without getting killed and it is now trying to win one
more. The adversary chooses probabilities pi’s and runs the tests. In each test it either dies, or
it wins, or nothing happens. Let β be the number of rounds remaining before the b tests of the
experiment end. The probability that the adversary wins one test before it dies and before the
game ends is:
µ1
def
=
β∑
t=1

t−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)(1− pj − εj)

 · (1− pt)(pt + εt) (1)
To show that this probability is less than 2/3 no matter what the choice of the pj’s is, we compute
the probability of a disjoint event. The event that the adversary dies before it wins the ℓ+ 1 test.
(Note that there is a third disjoint event in which the adversary does not die and does not win
during the remaining β tests.) The probability of the adversary dying before winning is:
µ2
def
=
β∑
t=1

t−1∏
j=1
(1− pj)(1 − pj − εj)

 · pt (2)
Comparing µ1 and µ2, we see that for each term in the summation, all the factors are the same
but the last. Since the εi’s are negligible (in k) and β is bounded by a polynomial (in k), then we
get that
µ1 − µ2 ≤ ε (3)
for some negligible fraction ε. Since µ1 and µ2 represent the probabilities of disjoint events, then
we also get
µ1 + µ2 ≤ 1. (4)
Combining Equations 3 and 4 we get
µ1 ≤
1
2
+
ε
2
<
2
3
and we are done with the proof of Claim 7.5. ✷
To summarize, the probability that the preamble of any proof instance Π ends well without
being solved, is at most
(
2
3
)a
. Recall that a =
⌈
m
log(mk)+1
⌉
− 2 = ω(log k) (and b ≤ (2mk)2), so we
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get that the above is a negligible fraction in k. Since we have at most mk instances of any of the k
proofs, the probability that the preamble of any of these proofs ends well without being solved by
our simulator is also negligible and we are done with the proof of Lemma 7.4. ✷
Using Lemma 7.4, we get that the simulator fails with negligible probability. Also, as in the static
case, when the simulator succeeds, it outputs an interaction that is polynomially indistinguishable
from the real interaction between the adversarial verifier and the real prover.
8 Resettable zero-knowledge
In this section, we show how to modify our interactive proof system to make it resettable zero-
knowledge. We start with the definitions and proceed with the construction.
8.1 Definitions
We provide the definitions of resettable zero-knowledge. For more detailed discussion and motiva-
tion the reader is referred to [3].
Definition 8.1 An interactive proof system (P, V ) for a language L is called resettable zero-
knowledge if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary V ∗ there exists a probabilistic poly-
nomial time simulator M∗ so that the following two distribution ensembles are computational in-
distinguishable: let t be a polynomial t = poly(n), let each distribution be indexed by a sequence of
common inputs x1, . . . , xt ∈ L ∩ {0, 1}
n and a corresponding sequence of prover’s auxiliary-inputs
y1, . . . , yt.
Distribution 1 is defined by the following random process which depends on P and V ∗:
1. Randomly select and fix t random tapes ø1, . . . , øt, for P , resulting in deterministic strategies
P (i,j) = Pxi,yi,øi defined by Pxi,yi,øi(α) being the output of P on input xi auxiliary yi, random
tape øi and a history so far α, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Each P
(i,j) is called an incarnation of
P .
2. Machine V ∗ is allowed to run polynomially many sessions with the P (i,j)’s. V ∗ is allowed to
send arbitrary messages to each of the of the P (i,j) and obtain the responses of P (i,j) to such
messages.
Distribution 2: the output of M∗(x1, . . . , xt).
We say that an interactive proof is black-box resettable zero-knowledge if there is a single universal
simulator that can simulate an adversarial verifier V ∗ by using V ∗ as a black box.
As will be shown in Section 8.2, the interactive proof that we present in this paper can be easily
modified into an interactive proof that has a specific structure denoted an admissible proof system
in [3]. Canetti et. al. provide an easy way to prove that an admissible interactive proof is resettable
zero-knowledge. Intuitively, an admissible proof is a proof in which the verifier restricts itself in the
beginning of the protocol to its answers in the rest of the protocol. In our modified proof (described
in Section 8.2 below), the verifier makes a commitment on all its future messages. In the rest of
the proof system it sends its messages by revealing the committed values from the beginning of the
proof. The prover aborts in case the verifier fails to reveal one of its strings appropriately.
The formal definition of admissible proofs partitions the consideration of the verifier commit-
ments and the rest of the proof, by considering two independent prover modules. One of them
deals with the commitments and verification of string revelation, and the other with the rest of the
proof. Each revelation of a string contains the string itself (called the main part of the message)
and a part witnessing that the revelation is correct (called the authenticator part of the message).
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Let us set some conventions before continuing with the formal definition. We assume that the
proof always starts with a verifier message specifying an incarnation of a prover P (i,j). The second
message is then sent by the prover and is called the initialization message. (In the special interesting
case the proof starts with a commitment, this message contains the random string of the prover
required to make the verifier commitment). The third message is a verifier message denoted the
determining message. We require that this message includes as a prefix the first two messages of
the proof.
Definition 8.2 A proof system (P, V ) is called admissible if the following requirements hold:
1. The prover P consists of two modules P1, P2. Similarly, the random input ø is partitioned
into two disjoint parts ø(1), ø(2), where ø(i) is given to Pi. The initialization message is sent
by P1.
2. Each verifier message other than the first is first received by P1 and is interpreted as consisting
of two parts, called main and authenticator. P1 decides whether to accept the message or to
abort. If P1 accepts, it forwards the main part of the message to P2 who generates the next
prover message.
3. Let V ∗ be an arbitrary (deterministic) polynomial-size circuit representing a possible strategy
for the verifier in the interactive proof (P, V ). Then, except with negligible probability, V ∗
is unable to generate two different messages for some round ℓ that are accepted by P1 with
respect to the same determining message.
We think of an incarnation of a prover P in an admissible proof as having three indices P (i,j,k). The
first index stands for the input and matching auxiliary input xi and yi. The second index stands
for the random tape of the first prover ø
(1)
j and the third index stands for the random tape of the
second prover ø
(2)
k .
In Section 8.2 below, we will present a modification of our protocol that is an admissible proof.
It is shown in [3] that for admissible proofs it is simpler to show that the proof is resettable zero-
knowledge. In particular, any admissible proof that is hybrid zero-knowledge is also resettable zero-
knowledge. In the hybrid model of zero-knowledge the verifier is allowed to use many incarnations of
provers P (i,j,k) but with a restriction: No two different incarnations may have the same k. Namely,
the verifier may run the prover many times, but the random coins of the second prover must be
random and independent in each run.
Let us define hybrid zero-knowledge. In Section 8.2 below we will show that our modified proof
is both admissible and hybrid zero-knowledge and therefore it is also resettable zero-knowledge.
Let us define hybrid zero-knowledge and quote the related assertion from [3].
Definition 8.3 Let (P, V ) be an admissible interactive proof with P1, P2 being the two modules of
the prover as in Definition 8.2. We say that (P, V ) is hybrid zero-knowledge if Definition 8.1 holds
when V ∗ in Distribution 1 of Definition 8.1 is restricted to interacting with incarnations of provers
P (i,j,k) such that no two incarnations P (i,j,k) and P (i
′,j′,k′) satisfy k = k′.
In Section 8.2 We will use the following corollary of [3]:
Corollary 8.4 [3], Corollary 9: If an admissible proof (P, V ) is hybrid zero-knowledge then (P, V )
is resettable zero-knowledge.
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8.2 Constructing resettable zero-knowledge
Let us now show how to modify our interactive proof system to make it resettable zero-knowledge.
Our proof is an easy extension of the proof in [3]. The details are provided for self containment. We
make the following two modifications. First, we fix the body of the proof to use the zero-knowledge
proof for 3-Colorability by Goldreich and Kahan [16]. Recall that in the body of the proof the
prover provides a zero-knowledge proof that the input theorem T is true or ∃i s.t. vi = pi. (See
Section 4 above.) Since the original theorem T is an NP statement then so is the assertion “T
is true or ∃i s.t. vi = pi”, and thus, given the preamble and the theorem T , it can be reduced
to Graph 3-Colorability, and proven in zero-knowledge via the Goldreich-Kahan proof system. A
property of this proof, is that the verifier commits on its queries, which are edges in the graph.
(For the honest verifier these are edges chosen uniformly at random.)
The second modification we make is that we modify the verifier to commit on its queries in
the Goldreich-Kahan proof system in the beginning of the protocol preamble together with the
commitments on the values v1, . . . , vm. Since the graph is not known at this time of the protocol
(recall that the reduction uses the messages sent by the parties during the preamble), the verifier
commits to n4 random pairs of vertices in the graph. Once the graph is determined, the proof will
consider only pairs of vertices that are edges in the graph. We remark that the soundness is not
substantially changed since the commitments of the verifier are done with statistical secrecy, and
since the probability to end up with a quadratic number of edge-challenges is overwhelming.
We would like to show that the resulting protocol is resettable zero-knowledge. But by Corollary
8.4, if an admissible proof (P, V ) is hybrid zero-knowledge then (P, V ) is resettable zero-knowledge.
We will first argue that this protocol is admissible, and then that it is hybrid zero-knowledge, and
we are done.
To show that the modified protocol is admissible, we have to define the two provers. We define
the first prover module to handle the verifier’s commitments. It supplies the random string required
for the verifier commitments and then handles the later revelations of committed values (with no
need for more random coins). The second prover module proceeds with the preamble only if the
first prover accepts the revelations. Then, during the body of the proof, the second prover gets the
revealed challenges and answers them. It can be easily verified that this satisfies the definition of
admissible proofs.
To show that the protocol is hybrid zero-knowledge we must modify the simulator to handle the
modifications in the protocol, and be able to deal with multiple incarnations of the prover using
(perhaps) the same random tape for the first prover’s module. We first note that the modifications
in the protocol do not interfere with the simulation as described. The simulator acts as a receiver
in the proof system and that can be done in polynomial time. “Solving a proof” carries the same
meaning as before, namely, setting a value pi to equal vi for some preamble round i.
The more interesting change is the additional power of the verifier, who may ask that the first
module of the prover be used with the same random string in several interactions. In terms of
efficiency, this bears no effect on the simulator. The simulator can keep a list of the random coins
used so far in the first prover module (i.e., to receive commitments from the verifier) and use these
strings repeatedly upon request from the verifier. But will the output still be of (almost) the same
distribution as the real interaction?
The distribution of the commitments as played by the first prover module is perfectly simulated
since the simulator plays exactly the same algorithm as the prover. It remains to check that the
influence of this power given to the verifier is not destructive to the behavior of the simulator with
respect to the second prover module. To see that it is not, one must verify that the secrecy and
binding properties of the commitment scheme still hold even when the receiver must receive various
commitments with the same random string. Looking into the commitment scheme with perfect
secrecy in [15] and [7] it turns out that this is a property of these commitment schemes. Namely,
the receiver starts by choosing a random string (or a random succinct description of a function)
and sends his choice to the verifier. If that choice is good (and that happens with overwhelming
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probability) then the committer can use that to make a polynomial number of commitments with
secrecy and binding properties preserved. (Actually, the same goes also for the computational
secrecy commitment scheme in [25], but that is not relevant to the argument.)
One additional issue, that has not been discussed, is whether the simulator may simulate several
proofs that do not have the same input. To see that this bears no additional difficulty on the
simulator, note that the input is only relevant for the body of the proof and there, the simulator
behaves like the real prover, regardless of which specific input the proof uses.
Thus, we get that the modified protocol is resettable zero-knowledge, and we are done with the
proof of Theorem 3.2.
9 Acknowledgment
We thank Cynthia Dwork, Uri Feige, Oded Goldreich, Yuval Rabani, and Amit Sahai for many
illuminating conversations on this subject.
References
[1] G. Brassard, D. Chaum and C. Cre´peau. Minimum Disclosure Proofs of Knowledge. In JCSS,
pages 156–189. 1988.
[2] C. Brassard, C. Crepeau and M. Yung, “Constant-Round Perfect Zero-Knowledge Computa-
tionally Convincing Protocols”, Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. 84, 1991, pp. 23-52.
[3] R. Canetti, O. Goldreich, S. Goldwasser and S. Micali. Resettable zero-knowledge. Revi-
sion 1 of Report TR99-042, the Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC)
ftp://ftp.eccc.uni-trier.de/pub/eccc/, June 2000. A preliminary version appears in
Proc. 32nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing May 2000.
[4] R. Canetti, J. Kilian, E. Petrank, and A. Rosen. Black-Box Concurrent Zero-Knowldege Re-
quires Ω˜(log n) Rounds. Thirty-Third Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing,
July 6-8, 2001.
[5] G. Di Crescenzo and R. Ostrovsky. “On Concurrent Zero-Knowledge with Pre-Processing”.
Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology (CRYPT0-99), pp. 485-502, Springer-Verlag Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, Vol 1666. 1999.
[6] I. D˚amgard. “Efficient Concurrent Zero-Knowledge in the Auxiliary String Model.” Advances
in Cryptology – Eurocrypt 2000 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Berlin:
Springer-Verlag, 2000.
[7] I. D˚amgard, T. Pedersen and B. Pfitzmann. On the Existence of Statistically Hiding Bit
Commitment Schemes and Fail-Stop Signatures. Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO ’93
Proceedings, pp. 250-265. Lecture Notes in Computer Science #773, Berlin: Springer-Verlag,
1994.
[8] D. Dolev, C. Dwork, and M. Naor. “Non-malleable cryptography”. In Proceedings of the 23rd
Symposium on Theory of Computing, ACM STOC, 1991.
[9] C. Dwork, M. Naor and A. Sahai. Concurrent Zero-Knowledge. Proceedings,30th Symposium
on Theory of Computing, pp. 409–428, 1998.
[10] C. Dwork and A. Sahai. Concurrent Zero-Knowledge: Reducing the Need for Timing Con-
straints. Proceedings, Advances in Cryptology – Crypto ’98.
22
[11] U. Feige. Ph.D. thesis, Weizmann Institute of Science, 1990.
[12] U. Feige, D. Lapidot and A. Shamir. Multiple non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs based on
a singe random string. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual IEEE Symposium on the Foundations
of Computer Science, pages 308–317, 1990.
[13] U. Feige and A. Shamir, “Zero Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge in Two Rounds”, Advances in
Cryptology – Crypto 89 proceedings, pp. 526-544, 1990.
[14] U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Baruch
Awerbuch, editor, Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Com-
puting, pages 416–426, Baltimore, MY, May 1990. ACM Press.
[15] O. Goldreich. Foundation of Cryptography - Fragments of
a Book . Available from the Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC)
http://www.eccc.uni-trier.de/eccc/, February 1995.
[16] O. Goldreich and A. Kahan, “How to Construct Constant-Round Zero-Knowledge Proof Sys-
tems for NP”, Journal of Cryptology, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1996, pp. 167–189.
[17] O. Goldreich, H. Krawczyk. On the Composition of Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems. SIAM J.
on Computing, Vol. 25, No.1, pp. 169-192, 1996
[18] O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson, “Proofs that Yield Nothing But their Validity or
All Languages in NP Have Zero-Knowledge proof Systems”, Jour. of ACM., Vol. 38, 1991, pp.
691–729.
[19] Oded Goldreich and Yair Oren. Definitions and properties of zero-knowledge proof systems.
Journal of Cryptology, 7(1):1–32, Winter 1994.
[20] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, C. Rackoff. The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proofs. Proc.
17th STOC, 1985, pp. 291-304.
[21] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff. “The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof
Systems”, SIAM J. Comput., 18 (1):186–208, 1989.
[22] J. Kilian. Zero-Knowledge with Log-Space Verifiers
Proceedings, 29th annual IEEE Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science.
[23] J. Kilian and E. Petrank. Concurrent zero-knowledge in poly-logarithmic rounds. In Pro-
ceedings of the thirty third annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. ACM Press,
2001.
[24] J. Kilian, E. Petrank, and C. Rackoff. “Lower Bounds for Zero-Knowledge on the Internet”,
Proceedings of the 39nd IEEE Conference on the Foundations of Computer Science, November
1998.
[25] M. Naor. “Bit Commitment Using Pseudo-Randomness,”, Journal of Cryptology, vol. 4, 1991,
pp.151-158.
[26] Moni Naor and Moti Yung. “Universal one-way hash functions and their cryptographic appli-
cations”, Proceedings of the Twenty First Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,
1989, pp. 33-43.
[27] Y. Oren. On the cunning powers of cheating verifiers: Some observations about zero knowledge
proofs. In Ashok K. Chandra, editor, Proceedings of the 28th Annual Symposium on Founda-
tions of Computer Science, pages 462–471, Los Angeles, CA, October 1987. IEEE Computer
Society Press.
23
[28] Ransom Richardson and Joe Kilian. On the Concurrent Composition of Zero-Knowledge
Proofs. In Proceeedings of Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT ’99, May 1999, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science Vol. 1592 Springer 1999, pp. 415-431
[29] A. Rosen. A Note on the Round-Complexity of Concurrent Zero-Knowledge. Advances in
Cryptology – Crypto 2000 proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1880, p. 451
24
